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The world is full of disagreements. According to this article, Equal Weight View
is a reasonable response to the epistemic significance of disagreement. But this view
was immediately rejected by others. This article defend this view from these rejecters.
In this way, Equal Weight View is identified as a reasonable response to the epistemic
significance of disagreement.
First, in order to be precision, to control for unintended factors and to set the
criterion for the epistemic significance of disagreement, we established the idealized
disagreement based on the concept of epistemic peers.
Second, having set up our idealized cases of disagreement, we examined two
broad camps: Steadfast Views of disagreement and Conciliatory Views of
disagreement. Equal Weight View belongs to Conciliatory Views, so it is confronted
with the challenge from Steadfast Views of disagreement at first. Besides, Equal
Weight View is also faced with the reject from the Total Evidence View and the
Justificationist View inside the Conciliatory Views of disagreement. The writer
defended the Equal Weight View from these rejects.
Finally, we back to the everyday disagreements, and examined the problems
when the Equal Weight View used in the everyday disagreements may occur. We end
up with the conclusion that whether in the idealized cases of disagreement or the
everyday disagreements, Equal Weight View is a reasonable response to the epistemic
significance of disagreement.
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disagreement）的分歧观和调和主义的分歧观（Conciliatory Views of disagreement）。






卫·克里斯滕森（David Christensen）为代表的均等权重说（Equal Weight View），
以托马斯·凯利为代表的整体主义（Total Evidence View）和以詹妮弗·拉基
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